



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24316
20 July 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 20 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that United States aircraft continued their violations of Iraqi airspace for purposes of observation and provocation during the period 7 to 15 July 1992.

7-8 July 1992

Twenty-eight sorties, flown by 14 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 6,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Tall Afar, Irbil and Amadiyah.

8-9 July 1992

Twenty-eight sorties, flown by 12 two-aircraft formations and 1 three-aircraft formation at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,000 to 6,500 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

At 1112 hours on 8 July, a United States A-10 aircraft dropped a heat flare in the area to the north-west of the Saddam Dam.

9-10 July 1992

Twenty-two sorties, flown by 11 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,500 to 8,500 metres, centred over Amadiyah, Zakho, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Tall Afar, Mosul, Irbil and Dukan.

10-11 July 1992

Twenty-four sorties, flown by 12 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 850 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 6,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Sinjar, Zakho, Amadiyah and Irbil.

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11-12 July 1992

Eighteen sorties, flown by 9 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 6,000 metres, centred over Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

12-13 July 1992

Eighteen sorties, flown by 9 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 2,500 to 7,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

13-14 July 1992

Fourteen sorties, flown by 7 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 6,000 metres, centred over Dohuk, Irbil, Mosul, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

14-15 July 1992

Six sorties, flown by 3 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 6,500 metres, centred over the area to the south-east of Amadiyah, the area north of Rawanduz and Mosul.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24317
20 July 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 20 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you of fresh violations of the cease-fire provisions by the Iranian side during the period 6 to 15 July 1992.

1. At 1015 hours on 6 July 1992, an Iranian helicopter was observed over the Khosravi complex and guard post engaged in observation. It was flying at moderate altitude inside the area of separation.

2. At 2000 hours on 6 July 1992, an Iranian helicopter flying at an altitude of 50 metres was observed coming from the Talkhab opening at coordinates 8318 and then heading towards the Ayn Ghazal guard post at coordinates 738198 inside the area of separation.

3. At 1810 hours on 8 July 1992, a mottled khaki-coloured helicopter belonging to the Iranian side flying at an altitude of 30 metres was observed coming from the Kanjan Dam road towards Mehran. It flew over the Mehran area for a period of five minutes and then returned in the direction from which it had come.

4. At 0700 hours on 9 July 1992, while the international observer team was investigating a previous Iranian violation, two Iranian boats were observed in the Shatt al-Arab at coordinates 180570.

5. At 0800 hours on 10 July 1992, four Iranian soldiers were observed carrying out maintenance work on the Iranian position at coordinates 364754 opposite the Bajaliyah guard post inside the area of separation.

6. At 0810 hours on 10 July 1992, a group of six to eight individuals from the Iranian side was observed establishing a new machine-gun position at coordinates 330850 opposite the Sharhani guard post inside the area of separation.

7. At 0710 hours on 11 July 1992, a group of some eight individuals from the Iranian side was observed completing the construction of an Iranian machine-gun position at coordinates 330850 to the left of the Sharhani guard post inside the area of separation.

8. At 0635 hours on 13 July 1992, two individuals from the Iranian side, one of them carrying a pickaxe, were observed strengthening the Iranian position at coordinates 033927 opposite the Tayyib guard post inside the area of separation.

9. At 0930 and 1105 hours on 14 July 1992, two white and red helicopters were observed coming from the Iranian rear. They landed at coordinates 4564 in the Naft-e Shah area.

10. At 1035 hours on 15 July 1992, a khaki-coloured helicopter was observed coming from the Iranian rear. It flew over the Naft-e Shah area, headed towards the north flying parallel to the international boundary line and then turned towards the Iranian rear.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



General Assembly Security Council

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GENERAL

A/46/949
S/24318
20 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 20
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 16 July 1992 from the Permanent Representative
of Sri Lanka to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has decided to accord formal recognition to the Republic of Georgia with immediate effect.

I should be glad if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 20, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Stanley KALPAGE
Permanent Representative



General Assembly Security Council

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A/46/950
S/24319
20 July 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 37
POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 17 July 1992 from the Permanent Representative
of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the second interim report of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, published within the framework of the International Hearing on Political Violence in South Africa and the Implementation of the National Peace Accord, which was held in London on 14 and 15 July 1992 (see annex).

We believe that this report helps to increase and deepen awareness of the situation in South Africa, and I should therefore be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Diego ARRIA
Permanent Representative
of Venezuela

ANNEX

Second interim report of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry
regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Chairman and members of the Commission have been appointed for three years. With regard to the broader issue of public violence and intimidation, the Commission therefore initially expected to have three years within which to report and make substantive recommendations relating to the curbing of violence. However, the significant escalation of violence in recent weeks has caused the Commission to re-evaluate its role and proceedings. It has decided to submit this further interim report now rather than wait for the reports of committees that are now still holding inquiries. In this report, however, the Commission has endeavoured not to anticipate or prejudge any of the disputed matters currently under investigation. The committees still holding inquiries are:

- (a) Thokoza;
- (b) Involvement of the South African Defence Force;
- (c) Taxi and train violence;
- (d) Mass demonstrations.

2. With regard to specific incidents of violence, the Commission's approach has been to inquire into paradigm situations where, on the face of it, the symptoms are common to other areas of violence. The Commission has at all times been convinced, and remains so, that factual findings cannot be made against individuals, groups or organizations on the basis of untested evidence. For this reason, the hearings of the Commission and of committees of the Commission have been held in public, and witnesses have been subjected to cross-examination by lawyers representing interested parties. This procedure, by its nature, is cumbersome and time-consuming. The Thokoza committee, for example, has been sitting for four months already and will require some further weeks to complete its public hearings.

3. From the inception of its deliberations, the Commission has held the view that one of its most important functions is to act as a catalyst in the process of transforming the police force into a body that has the confidence, respect and cooperation of the vast majority of the people of South Africa. The committee established to inquire into the policing of mass demonstrations was conceived as the point of entry - the first of a number of inquiries that would investigate and make recommendations on important issues relating to policing in general. If the Commission continues to be immersed in an increasing number of inquiries into incidents of violence, this important function will inevitably be delayed.

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4. Then there is the issue concerning the safety of witnesses who testify before the Commission. The murder of the leader of the "Black Cats" in Wesselton and the apparent revenge murder of the mother of a renegade "Black Cat" witness in the same township highlight this problem. These murders took place during the course of the investigation into the "Black Cats" and are therefore likely to severely diminish the willingness of members of the public to come forward and testify.

5. In the above circumstances, a reconsideration of the role and functions of the Commission has become urgent and inevitable. In particular, the Commission has been forced by circumstances to report now on conclusions reached by it at this stage. It would have preferred not to do so at what is clearly a premature juncture in its work. However, the alternative would be to continue inquiring with judicial detachment when urgent steps are required to contain the violence.

6. The Commission, in dealing with the matters contained in this report, makes no apology for doing so at this stage. However, it does request the understanding and appreciation of the entire public of South Africa that a report at this time on these issues is being furnished only some six months after the Commission was established. If the conclusions set out below are flawed, that must be ascribed to incomplete information and the failure by persons or organizations with relevant information to have placed it before the Commission.

II. THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE

7. The words "third force" have been used by many people in South Africa in many contexts and with no consistent meaning. The phrase has been used frequently with reference to a sinister and secret organization or group that commits acts of violence in furtherance of some nefarious political aim. Then, again, it was recently used by the President of the African National Congress to describe the alleged activities of 32 Battalion, the CCB "hit squads" and the police, i.e. identifiable groups or organizations.

8. The Commission has received no evidence which would suggest that there is a third force of the first type mentioned in paragraph 7, i.e. a sinister and secret organization orchestrating political violence on a wide front. The allegations concerning State institutions are dealt with later in this report.

9. The evidence which thus far has been placed before the Commission indicates rather that the causes of the violence are many and complicated. In historical sequence they include:

(a) The economic, social and political imbalances among the people of South Africa. These are the consequences of three centuries of racial discrimination and over 40 years of an extreme form of racial and economic dislocation in consequence of the policy of apartheid. The consequences of

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these policies on the Black people of South Africa are well known and documented. It is not necessary or appropriate even to attempt to set them out in this report;

(b) A police force and army which, for many decades, have been the instruments of oppression by successive White governments in maintaining a society predicated upon racial discrimination. This involves a police force and an army that for the majority of South Africans have not been community based or orientated. For many South Africans, the police and the army are not perceived as fair, objective or friendly institutions;

(c) The unexpected and sudden legalizing of large and predominantly Black-supported political organizations. This must be seen against a background of a lawful and Government-supported Inkatha Freedom Party having been at war with a largely underground African National Congress and its front organizations. With rapid change, the Government, again suddenly and unexpectedly, resolved to negotiate in public and in private with organizations that were perceived, for good reason or bad, as the enemy of Inkatha, of White South Africans and, most important, of the police and army;

(d) For obvious reasons, many already mentioned above, there is a climate of political intolerance, particularly in the Black community. The sudden emergence of powerful national political parties has not resulted in any improvement in the lives of Black South Africans. On the contrary, the deterioration of our economy has, if anything, made all South Africans, and especially those in the lower income groups, economically poorer;

(e) Again, for obvious reasons, the foregoing factors have created a situation in which violence has found a fertile breeding ground. In particular, it is a situation in which criminal elements within the community have found themselves in a position where the police force is inadequately manned and inadequately motivated. The presence of single-sex hostels and/or squatter settlements in a large number of centres has enabled political groups to set up concentrations of support and arms caches for use in township violence. Similarly, other groups have total control over certain residential areas in Black townships;

(f) As far as political violence is concerned, the Commission has no doubt at all that both African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party members and supporters have been guilty of many incidents that have resulted in the deaths of and injuries to large numbers of people. Both organizations have been over-hasty in accusing the other of being the cause of such conduct. Each has been tardy, especially at the level of top leadership, in taking adequate and effective steps to stop the violence by imposing discipline and accountability among its membership. The investigations of the Commission thus far do not enable it to apportion blame, even if that dubious exercise were relevant;

(g) A history over some years of State complicity in undercover activities, which include criminal conduct. Those activities have enabled

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critics of the Government and others, fairly or unfairly, to place the blame for much of the current violence at the door of the security forces. That and the well-documented criminal conduct by individual members of the South African Police and the KwaZulu Police exacerbate the perception of so many South Africans that the Government or its agencies are active parties responsible for the violence. As with the political parties referred to above, our recent history has been one in which the Government has failed to take sufficiently firm steps to prevent criminal conduct by members of the security forces and the police and to ensure that the guilty are promptly and adequately punished.

10. It is little wonder, therefore, that the situation of political violence and intimidation in South Africa is so widespread and its causes so many and so complex.

III. STEPS TO CURB VIOLENCE

11. No good purpose will be served by merely conducting further inquiries in order to apportion the blame for past violence. It must be accepted that individual policemen, African National Congress supporters and Inkatha Freedom Party supporters have been guilty of serious criminal conduct in this regard. If we are to curb this violence then all our efforts must be harnessed in creating the means of doing so.

12. The Commission recommends at this stage that the following steps can and should be taken immediately:

(a) The deployment in local communities of an effective police presence, which is able to work in close cooperation with local dispute resolution committees established in terms of the Peace Accord. If they are perceived by the local communities as working with their own representatives, there is some prospect that they will be perceived as a friendly force and will begin to gain communal confidence and support;

(b) The new Division of Internal Stability would appear to be the only suitable branch of the South African Police for such work. This branch should also work in cooperation with justices of the peace as soon as that office has been created in terms of the Peace Accord;

(c) The investigative functions of the Commission will continue to play an important role in relation to the curbing of ongoing violence. In this regard, the Commission should as soon as possible be granted adequate means and procedures for offering protection to witnesses who testify before it or its committees;

(d) The widely held view by a large number of people in KwaZulu and neighbouring areas that the KwaZulu Police are a private army of the Inkatha Freedom Party is a matter of great concern in relation to the curbing of violence in those areas. No less disturbing is the evidence that has been

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given concerning unlawful activities by senior members of the KwaZulu Police. As some of these allegations are at present under investigation by a committee of the Commission, it would not be proper to comment further on this matter at the present time. Criminal charges are at present being investigated by the Commissioner of the KwaZulu Police in consequence of evidence placed before the committee about the false identity given to a member of that police force;

(e) Recent activities by members of Umkontho we Sizwe are a matter for concern. It is significant in this regard that a Transvaal leader of that organization admitted to a committee of the Commission that it was unable to control all its members;

(f) Organizations whose members are responsible for violence have a heavy responsibility to control and impose discipline upon their members. This applies no less to the South African Defence Force and Police than to the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. All of those organizations should establish committees to be responsible for immediately investigating and reporting to the Peace Committee and the Commission on allegations of public violence;

(g) Hostels are common to most of the worst areas of violence. All hostels should immediately be adequately and securely fenced. A strong and efficient police presence should ensure that no arms are taken in or out of hostels. It should also be in a position to protect all hostel dwellers from external attack;

(h) The Commission is convinced that the carrying of any dangerous weapons in public should be outlawed - whether in respect of political meetings or at any other place. In Natal, it is predominantly members of the Inkatha Freedom Party who insist on this unacceptable practice. Other Zulu men do not find it necessary to do so, either for cultural or any other reasons. The Commission finds it quite unacceptable that even the limited ban on the carrying of weapons to political meetings has been ignored by the Inkatha Freedom Party on at least one occasion during a march through the streets of Johannesburg. This public flouting of the law in the presence of a large South African Police presence is unfortunate and should not be allowed to occur again in the future. Steps should be taken urgently to prohibit the carrying in public of any dangerous weapons at any time at all. This constitutes provocative and unacceptable behaviour in any decent society. It is calculated, furthermore, to create a climate of violence.

13. The Commission can assure you that all information received by it has already been publicly investigated or is the subject of current public inquiry. In the result, no information has been received by the Commission that could enable it to make any findings relating to a systematic or nationally organized campaign of violence. It is a cause for comment that, notwithstanding the absence of evidence, political leaders, especially in the African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party, have frequently made wide-ranging allegations placing the blame for violence on other political

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parties and on the State security forces. The violence is an ongoing phenomenon. If and when evidence is placed before the Commission it will be thoroughly and publicly investigated. Unless and until that is done the Commission can only deprecate allegations that are calculated to exacerbate the climate of violence.



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S/24320
20 July 1992
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 668 (1990) of 20 September 1990, 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991, 718 (1991) of 31 October 1991, 728 (1992) of 8 January 1992, and 745 (1992) of 28 February 1992,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 12 June 1992 (S/24091),

Recalling also that any difficulty arising in the implementation of the Paris Agreements should be settled through close consultation between the SNC and UNTAC and must not be allowed to undermine the principles of these Agreements, or to delay the timetable for their implementation,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General dated 14 July 1992 (S/24286), and in particular of the fact that CPP, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF have agreed to proceed with phase II of the cease-fire as laid down in annex 2 of the first Paris Agreement and that the Party of Democratic Kampuchea has so far refused to do so,

Taking note also of the declaration on the Cambodia Peace Process adopted in Tokyo on 22 June 1992 (S/24183), and the other efforts made there by the countries and parties concerned for the implementation of the Paris Agreements,

1. Expresses its deep concern at the difficulties met by UNTAC in the implementation of the Paris Agreements;
2. Underlines that all signatories of the Agreements are bound by all their obligations thereunder;
3. Deplores the continuing violations of the cease-fire and urges all parties to cease all hostilities forthwith, to cooperate fully with UNTAC in the marking of all minefields and to refrain from any deployment, movement, or other action intended to extend the territory they control or which might lead to renewed fighting;

4. Reaffirms the international community's firm commitment to a process under which UNTAC, operating freely throughout all of Cambodia, as authorized by the Paris Agreements, can verify the departure of all foreign forces and ensure full implementation of the Agreements;

5. Demands that all parties respect the peaceful nature of UNTAC's mission and take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of all United Nations personnel;

6. Urges all parties to cooperate with UNTAC in broadcasting information helpful to implementation of the Paris Agreements;

7. Strongly deplores the continuing refusal by one of the parties to permit the necessary deployment of all components of UNTAC to the areas under its control to enable UNTAC to carry out its full functions in the implementation of the Paris Agreements;

8. Urges all States, in particular neighbouring countries, to provide assistance to UNTAC to ensure the effective implementation of the Paris Agreements;

9. Approves the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to implement the Agreements despite the difficulties;

10. Invites in particular the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to accelerate the deployment of UNTAC's civilian components, especially the component mandated to supervise or control the existing administrative structures;

11. Demands that the Party that has failed so far to do so permit without delay the deployment of UNTAC in the areas under its control, and implement fully Phase II of the Plan as well as the other aspects of the Paris Agreements;

12. Requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to ensure that international assistance to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia from now on only benefits the parties which are fulfilling their obligations under the Paris Agreements and cooperating fully with UNTAC;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



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20 July 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 19 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With a view to dealing with the predicament relating to the building of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, my Government makes the following proposal:

"Iraq shall invite a group of experts from the States of the Non-Aligned Movement and possibly from other States, such as China, Austria and Sweden, to visit the building of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and to inspect its contents in order to ascertain that no materials or documentation relevant to resolution 687 (1991) are present. Such visit shall be outside the mandate of the Special Commission."

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated to the members of the Security Council as a document of the Security Council, and I shall be glad to convey to my Government any clarifications that you may seek, regarding the implementation of the above-mentioned proposal.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



General Assembly Security Council

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S/24322
20 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 68
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 20 July 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, a memorandum of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning some unresolved questions of delimitation with the Republic of Croatia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would publish this letter and its annex as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 68, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX

Memorandum of the Government of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia concerning some unresolved questions of
delimitation with the Republic of Croatia

After the establishment of independent States in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a number of questions remained unresolved, which - in order to tranquillize the situation and normalize the relations - should be settled in the period to come.

One of these questions is the delimitation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia at Cape Prevlaka (Ostra) in the Adriatic Sea.

Cape Prevlaka is situated at the entry into the Bay of Boka Kotorska, which belongs to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This area of 5.24 square kilometres, mainly uninhabited, has always been used (also in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) for situating military installations ensuring control of the Bay of Boka Kotorska. Historically, it was always within the borders of the State to which the Bay belonged. From the legal point of view, this land is the property of the former JNA (Yugoslav People's Army), proof for which exists in cadastres, although after the administrative borders of the Republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were drawn, it became part of the territory of the Socialist Republic of Croatia.

In view of the above and the fact that, with its position, Prevlaka controls the entire Bay of Boka Kotorska, that is 30 per cent of the coast of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as the need to reach a just sea and epicontinental delimitation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro (on whose territory the Bay of Boka Kotorska is situated) addressed an initiative to the Republic of Croatia on 7 October 1991 to resolve the problem of Prevlaka by agreed and peaceful delimitation. The Assembly of the Republic of Croatia basically accepted the initiative. Consequently, informal bilateral talks were held between the representatives of the Republic of Montenegro and the Republic of Croatia, and talks were held on the highest level at the Conference on Yugoslavia at The Hague and at Brussels. Unfortunately, until now, these efforts have not produced expected results.

Since this outstanding question may, in the present situation, continue and even increase tensions, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that it is necessary to proceed, without delay, to its just settlement by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Expressing its readiness, once again, to fully implement the provisions of the United Nations peace-keeping plan, particularly those concerning the withdrawal of the units of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the territory of the Republic of Croatia following the assumption of responsibility by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the United Nations protected zones, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia underlines that, pending the final solution to the question of delimitation, the Yugoslav Army is ready to leave the Prevlaka area, provided that this area is placed under temporary control of the United Nations.



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20 July 1992
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
YEMEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that, in the light of Security Council
resolution 757 (1992), the Government of the Republic of Yemen has recalled
its Ambassador in Belgrade.

(Signed) Abdalla Saleh AL-ASHTAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



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20 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

Referring to your note verbale ref. SCPC/1/92 (4)s dated 3 June 1992, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of the Sudan, in conformity with Security Council resolution 757 (1992), has taken the following measures:

- (1) The Sudan Government has recalled its Ambassador from Belgrade;
- (2) The Sudan Government, abiding by the aforesaid resolution, has stopped all economic and commercial relations with Yugoslavia.

I would be grateful if you could circulate this message as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Ahmed SULIMAN
Permanent Representative



Security Council

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20 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 20 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to his note dated 3 June 1992 concerning Security Council resolution 757 (1992).

In this connection, the Permanent Representative has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that after adoption of the resolution, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not have any relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the fields of air, economy and culture and that there are a small number of diplomatic personnel at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Pyongyang.



Security Council

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S/24326
21 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the latter's note dated 3 April 1992 concerning Security Council resolution 748 (1992) adopted by the Council at its 3063rd meeting, held on 31 March 1992.

In this respect, the Permanent Representative has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has, at present, no transaction with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya under the provisions contained in resolution 748 (1992) and keeps a limited number of diplomatic personnel in Tripoli.



Security Council

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S/24327
21 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 17 JULY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SIERRA LEONE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to note SCPC/1/92(4) of 3 June 1992, has the honour to inform him that the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone has instituted, with immediate effect, the measures contained in the annex to the present note, in compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 757 (1992), adopted with regard to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Annex

The Government of Sierra Leone announces that, following the adoption of Security Council resolution 757 (1992) on 30 May 1992, relating to events in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the following measures shall come into immediate effect until further notice:

1. Banning of imports of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported after 30 May 1992;
2. Banning of activities of nations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) after 30 May 1992;
3. No institution in Sierra Leone shall make available to the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) any funds or any other financial or economic resources. Furthermore, Sierra Leone nationals and non-nationals are prohibited from removing from Sierra Leone or otherwise making available to the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) except payments exclusively for strictly medical and humanitarian purposes;
4. Permission shall be denied to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly Sierra Leone if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unless the particular flight has been approved for humanitarian purposes.

It should be recalled that the United Nations Security Council adopted several resolutions with a view to achieving a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis. The demands in these resolutions, particularly Security Council resolution 752 (1992), have not been complied with. The Council has therefore decided to impose the aforementioned measures, among others.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24328
21 July 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 21 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
OF BELGIUM, FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to call your attention to the text of a declaration on Yugoslavia adopted by the European Community and its member States in Brussels on 20 July 1992.

We should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative of Belgium
to the United Nations

(Signed) Jean-Bernard P. H. P. MERIMEE
Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations

(Signed) Sir David HANNAY
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom to the United Nations

Annex

Declaration on Yugoslavia

[Original: English/French]

The Community and its member States express their deep concern that the Agreement between the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina signed at London on 17 July under the aegis of the European Community (EC) Conference on Yugoslavia has not yet come into effect. All parties must comply fully and immediately with the Agreement and must scrupulously observe the cease-fire throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. They welcome the prompt action by the United Nations Security Council, working in close cooperation with the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, to put into effect the supervision of the heavy weaponry specified in the London Agreement.

The Community and its member States reaffirm their full commitment to the work of the EC Conference, chaired by Lord Carrington. It has the central role in the search for a fair and lasting political solution to the problems of the former Yugoslavia, including constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina. They favour close consultation between the EC Conference, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations in support of the continuing efforts of the international community to solve the Yugoslavia crisis. These consultations could lead to the broadening and intensification of the present Conference.

The Community and its member States condemn all forms of ethnic cleansing and forced expulsion. Attacks on unarmed civilians, such as those by Serbian forces at Sarajevo and Gorazde, are wholly contrary to the basic precepts of international humanitarian law. The Community and its member States intend to pursue vigorously in the CSCE the possibility of sending monitor missions to places where such attacks have been reported.

Considerable resources are urgently needed for refugee relief, preferably in areas closest to the original place of residence. An additional 120-million-ECU package of emergency assistance provided by the Community is being made available immediately. All aid of this kind and a corresponding effort to be organized in the context of the Group of 24 must be directed to wherever and for whatever purpose it is most urgently needed in the former Yugoslavia. The Community and its member States warmly welcome the decision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to convene a conference in the immediate future on the flood of refugees in and from the former Yugoslavia, which will need to consider urgently an equitable solution to the problems caused by the potential inflow of refugees from neighbouring countries. They commit themselves to cooperate wholeheartedly with this conference, to assume their responsibilities in this context and to call upon ministers of the interior and ministers of justice to give their urgent attention to this issue. They call on all parties to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid, in particular to areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina which

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remain in desperate need of assistance, including through the establishment of humanitarian corridors.

The Community and its member States welcome the advice of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, chaired by Mr. Badinter. It is for Serbia and Montenegro to decide whether they wish to form a new federation. But this new federation cannot be accepted as the sole successor to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the light of this, the Community and its member States will oppose the participation of Yugoslavia in international bodies. The Presidency will make early arrangements for the missions of the Community and its member States to the international organizations to prepare proposals to implement this policy. The United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and all United Nations resolutions should be maintained and strictly implemented. In this respect, the Community and its member States welcome the decisions taken by the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to monitor the implementation of the United Nations sanctions at sea.

The Community and its member States are impressed by the courageous performance and the practical achievements of their Monitor Mission. They are willing to reinforce these activities in close cooperation with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Monitor Mission, acting under its mandate from the CSCE, would also be ready to monitor in particularly sensitive border areas in the region. Discussions on this with the various parties will be undertaken by the Presidency.

The Community and its member States express their sadness at the recent death on duty of two French members of UNPROFOR. They send their condolences to the men's families and to the Government and people of France.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24329
21 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF MYANMAR TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to his Note No. SCPC/1/92(4) dated 3 June 1992 has the honour to inform him that the Government of the Union of Myanmar, in conformity with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, have instituted all necessary measures to ensure strict compliance by all Ministries, Government Departments and organizations concerned with the obligations set out in Security Council resolution 757 (1992).



Security Council

Distr.
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S/24330
21 July 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT
MISSION OF PANAMA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Panama to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to his note SCPC/1/92 (2) concerning the measures instituted to meet the obligations set out in Security Council resolution 748 (1992).

In this connection, I have the honour to inform you that, with regard to the action provided for in paragraph 6 (a) of the above-mentioned resolution, Mr. Khalid Mohamad Alkilani, Financial Attaché of the Libyan Embassy in the Republic of Panama, left the country on Saturday, 13 June 1992, at 9.15 a.m. on KLM flight 744.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24331
21 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to present to you this letter dated 20 July 1992 from
the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the letter as a
document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 20 July 1992 from the President of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General

According to the Agreement reached in London on 17 July this year under the patronage of Lord Carrington, Chairman of the European Community (EC) Conference on Yugoslavia, a cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina was due to come into force yesterday, 19 July, at 6 p.m. This was confirmed also in our meeting yesterday with the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Milan Panić. We also agreed that we would take the first steps towards establishing peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the heavy artillery around Gorazde would today be withdrawn to Serbia and Montenegro, and that the artillery around Sarajevo would be placed under the control of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the places where part of that weaponry has already been concentrated, in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 758 (1992).

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted this plan and have observed the cease-fire.

However, in spite of the London Agreement and the promises of Mr. Panić, the attacks of the aggressor have continued in almost all areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in some places have intensified.

All last night Sarajevo was under fierce artillery bombardment. At about 10 a.m. this morning the Presidency building was hit. Five citizens have been killed, and more than 30 injured. UNPROFOR has been forced to temporarily suspend the arrival of humanitarian aid because of shooting in the immediate vicinity of the airport. There are reliable indications that the aggressor is preparing a general assault on the city.

Attacks with heavy weapons continue against Bosanski Brod, Derventa, Srebrenica and Bihać. The situation in Gorazde is still very grave. New columns of tanks are crossing the Serbian frontier into Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Priboj-Rudo road towards that besieged city. We do not yet possess data for all places, but we have just received news that in Bihać alone in the past 12 hours 11 civilians have been killed and 29 injured. An infantry breakthrough has been attempted into recently liberated Mostar.

All this indicates that all proclamations and promises on the part of the aggressors that they are ready for peace are merely attempts to deceive international opinion.

Unless the international community, and above all the United Nations Security Council, take more decisive measures to stop this aggression, it will dangerously escalate. These may be the last moments for stopping the conflict.

(Signed) Alija IZETBEOVIC



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24332
22 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF BANGLADESH TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

Kindly refer to your note No. SCPC/1/92(4) dated 3 June 1992.

In this connection, I have the honour to inform that the Government of Bangladesh has taken necessary measures to implement the provisions of paragraphs 4 to 9 of Security Council resolution 757 (1992).

(Signed) Humayun KABIR
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/24333
21 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

INTRODUCTION

1. In a statement made by its President on 17 July 1992 (S/24307), the Security Council welcomed the agreement signed earlier that day in London by the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the parties, inter alia, asked the Security Council to make arrangements for international supervision of all their heavy weapons (see S/24305, annex). The President's statement recorded the Security Council's decision in principle to respond positively to this request and called upon the parties to declare immediately to the Force Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) the locations and quantities of the heavy weapons to be placed under international supervision. The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report by 20 July on the implementation and resource implications of this decision.

2. The Force Commander of UNPROFOR immediately instructed his Sector Commander in Sarajevo to enter into contact with the representatives of the three parties with a view to identifying the locations and quantities of heavy weapons to be supervised. However, no relevant information was made available by any of the parties, two of whom had, by noon New York time on 21 July 1992, made no response at all to the Force Commander's request. In these circumstances, the Force Commander submitted to me on 19 July 1992 a proposed Concept of Operations for UNPROFOR to supervise the parties' heavy weapons, on the basis of such information as was available to him from public sources. Estimates of the resources required by this Concept of Operations have been prepared by the Force Commander on the basis of experience acquired by UNPROFOR in the course of its deployment in the region. The Force Commander's Concept of Operations is annexed to the present report. Its financial implications are outlined in an addendum which will be circulated separately.

I. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3. The Concept of Operations proposed by General Nambiar envisages the deployment of United Nations military observers (UNMOs) throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, other than Sarajevo, where separate arrangements are already in effect. The UNMOs would supervise, through liaison, monitoring and patrolling, the heavy weapons of all parties to the conflict in that Republic. Some 1,100 UNMOs would be required and they would be based in 62 "equipment-collection points" (ECPs) which would be grouped into seven "patrol areas". Teams of six UNMOs at each ECP would conduct the necessary patrols on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

4. The UNMOs would, to the extent possible, have to be self-sufficient in respect of their accommodation and subsistence. They would require vehicles (three per patrol team in the initial phase), communications equipment, office equipment and working space, and technical and administrative support. A large number of interpreters, and smaller numbers of civil affairs and information personnel would also be necessary, as would adequate arrangements for medical care and the evacuation of casualties.

5. The Force Commander's concept also envisages that the UNMOs would have an important role in helping the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies to identify requirements for humanitarian relief. This is based on the assumption that implementation of the London Agreement would open up access to many areas where there are pressing humanitarian needs and that UNPROFOR would inevitably be expected to help UNHCR and other agencies respond to these needs.

6. The success of such an operation would be impossible without the cooperation of the parties, who would be required to declare all the heavy weapons in their possession and to cooperate with UNPROFOR in concentrating these at locations where they could be monitored. It would also be necessary for the parties to demonstrate a genuine commitment to a sustained and lasting cease-fire and to maintain that commitment largely without international help for several weeks, for reasons explained in paragraph 12 below.

II. OBSERVATIONS

7. After carefully considering the London Agreement and the circumstances in which it was concluded, as well as the advice of the Force Commander, I have come to the conclusion that the conditions do not exist for me to recommend that the Security Council accept the request of the three parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the United Nations supervise the heavy weapons which, in the second paragraph of the London Agreement, they have agreed to declare and place under international supervision. This is for a variety of reasons, some of them relating to principle and some to practical considerations.

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8. In the first place, the request contained in the London Agreement raises the question of the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. In "An Agenda for Peace" (S/24111), I have stated my view that their potential should be utilized in serving the functions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations describes the role which such arrangements and agencies can play and lays down guidelines for their relationship with the United Nations and specifically with the Security Council. That Chapter underlines the primary responsibility of the Security Council in such matters, providing, for instance, that in certain circumstances it can "utilize" regional organizations or agencies. There is no provision for the reverse to occur. In other instances when the United Nations and a regional organization have both been involved in an international peace and security situation, care has been taken to ensure that the primacy of the world Organization has not been compromised.

9. Secondly, the United Nations did not participate in the negotiation of the London Agreement. Only on the eve of its signature were my staff informed of the request it was likely to contain and given the opportunity to draw attention to the practical constraints on UNPROFOR's ability to carry out this task. It is most unusual for the United Nations to be asked to help implement a politico-military agreement in whose negotiation it has played no part. The London Agreement is thus very different from the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia which was negotiated by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, assisted by experienced staff from the Secretariat. As a matter of principle, I believe that such staff should be involved in the negotiation of any agreement which is likely to give rise to a peace-keeping role for the United Nations.

10. My concern on these two points is heightened by the lack of clarity concerning the respective roles of the United Nations and the European Community in implementation of the London Agreement. In its first paragraph, the parties have undertaken to explore measures for strengthening the cease-fire in the longer term. It is not clear whether the European Community would help them to do this (they would certainly not be able to do it without third party help), as part of the follow-up to an agreement mediated by the Community, or whether this role would be performed by the United Nations, which in the second paragraph is asked by the parties to perform a function that would be the main determinant of whether the cease-fire could be strengthened. In order to clarify this and other points, I have asked Lord Carrington to make available to me the records of the London negotiations.

11. Thirdly, it is well established that certain conditions have to exist before a successful peace-keeping operation can be established. These include the consent and cooperation of the parties and a practicable mandate. Neither exists in the present case. The cease-fire which was supposed to begin on 19 July 1992 has not come into effect in Sarajevo or, to judge from media reports, elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary, fighting has intensified to the extent that relief operations through Sarajevo airport had to be suspended on 20 July and again today. None of the parties has declared

to UNPROFOR the quantity and locations of its heavy weapons, information without which the Force Commander cannot begin to plan the additional deployment which would be needed in order to supervise them.

12. Fourthly, the additional function which UNPROFOR is asked to assume is simply beyond the present operational and logistical capability of the United Nations. UNPROFOR is already stretched to the breaking-point, with severe shortages of civilian personnel and of almost all categories of equipment. The Force Commander has told me that he would have neither personnel nor vehicles which he could spare for this new function. Nor do other United Nations peace-keeping operations have spare resources that could be redeployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In spite of repeated requests to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has not been authorized to establish a reserve stock of basic peace-keeping equipment which would enable me to respond quickly to new requirements of this kind. Only a handful of Member States have committed themselves to keep military personnel on stand-by for service in United Nations peace-keeping operations and many of them have already exhausted their reserves of such personnel, as a result of unprecedented demand during the current year. I am advised that in these circumstances it would take at least three months to deploy all the personnel and equipment required to implement the Force Commander's concept. There is reason to doubt whether the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina would respect the cease-fire for so long a period without their heavy weapons being supervised.

13. Fifthly, there is a question of priorities. The United Nations is already massively engaged in the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is leading the international effort to deal with the largest humanitarian crisis which has afflicted Europe since the Second World War, with 2.25 million refugees and displaced persons and another 850,000 persons estimated to be trapped in their homes by the fighting. An international conference on this problem is being convened by her on 29 July. UNHCR alone has already provided more than 25,000 tonnes of relief supplies and estimates its total requirements till 31 March 1993 at \$141.9 million, of which only \$52.1 million has been received so far. On the peace-keeping side, some 13,600 troops are deployed in Croatia, the third largest force ever fielded by the Organization. Their mandate is constantly expanding as experience on the ground brings to light further complexities in implementing the United Nations peace-keeping plan. In Sarajevo another major operation has been mounted, at great risk to the security of the personnel involved, to reopen the airport for humanitarian relief flights. My concern is that if the Security Council continues to concentrate its attention and resources to such an extent on Yugoslav problems, this will be at the expense of the Organization's ability to help resolve equally cruel and dangerous conflicts elsewhere, e.g. in Somalia.

14. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that in conveying to the Security Council my view that the conditions do not exist for it to accept the request addressed to it by the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I am not decrying the European Community's achievement in negotiating the London Agreement. Nor am I suggesting any reduction in the existing activities of

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the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia. On the contrary, I shall shortly recommend to the Council a further enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in the United Nations Protected Areas. Nor, of course, am I questioning the Security Council's right to decide what the response of the United Nations to the London Agreement should be.

Annex

Concept of operations

INTRODUCTION

1. The aim of the present annex is to outline the reinforcement to UNPROFOR required for the extension of its mandate to include the monitoring of a cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the London Agreement) (S/24305, annex).

2. It is assumed throughout that:

(a) All parties continue to support the Agreement and that there is no widespread breakdown of the cease-fire before an UNPROFOR deployment;

(b) All sides will agree to concentrate heavy weapons at points agreed with UNPROFOR. Given the large quantity of heavy weapons involved, it will be impossible to monitor them in their current positions;

(c) Sarajevo is not included in the operation. The nature of the task and deployments in the city mean that it will be a separate operation under the command of UNPROFOR headquarters;

(d) If the cease-fire holds, the infrastructure of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be steadily restored;

(e) Implementation of the London Agreement will open access to many areas in urgent need of humanitarian relief and UNPROFOR will inevitably be expected to support the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies.

A. The mission

3. The mission of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (less Sarajevo) is to supervise the parties' heavy weapons as provided for in the London Agreement.

B. Requirements

4. The mission requires:

(a) Establishing equipment collection points (ECPs) for heavy weapons;

(b) Monitoring ECPs;

(c) Monitoring actual and potential trouble spots;

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(d) Establishing a United Nations military observer (UNMO) presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the time-frame of the London Agreement;

(e) The use of the good offices of the United Nations to maintain the cease-fire;

(f) Assisting UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies to identify requirements for humanitarian relief.

I. FACTORS AFFECTING THE OPERATION

A. The parties

5. Time. The warring parties have agreed to only a 14-day cease-fire.

Deduction: Initial deployment of UNPROFOR must take place as soon as possible, but not later than 2 August 1992 when the initial 14-day agreement expires.

6. Geography. The main areas of conflict (excluding Sarajevo Sector) are the Bihac region, Tuzla region, the Sava River from Derвента to Brcko, Foca to Gorazde, south-eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Dubrovnik to Herceg Novi, central Bosnia and Herzegovina from Jajce to Zenica and the Mostar area. (See map, appendix A.) There are reports of "ethnic cleansing" throughout the remainder of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Note that although in Croatia, Dubrovnik is closely linked to neighbouring areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Deduction: The cease-fire monitoring tasks can be achieved in geographically limited areas, but humanitarian tasks will be required throughout the Republic.

7. Command and control. Experience shows that the parties do not have full control of their forces. To influence the situation, pressure must be applied to all levels throughout the Republic.

Deductions:

(a) There will have to be constant liaison on all sides and at all levels, for example on the Serb side with the Government of the so-called Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its army headquarters, its corps headquarters and local military commanders and civil leaders;

(b) This is the key part of the operation and must take place as quickly as possible from the top downwards;

(c) Breakdowns in the cease-fire must be anticipated and it may be impossible for UNPROFOR to influence the situation;

(d) To maintain contact with the more "independent" groups, a coordinated television/radio campaign, involving all sides, explaining the roles and mandate of UNPROFOR must be initiated.

B. Infrastructure

8. Movement. Although the infrastructure of Bosnia and Herzegovina was previously well established, there has been significant damage to it and road movement will be difficult in many areas, e.g. most of the bridges across the Neretva River have been destroyed. Many other routes are blocked by landslides or cratering. The extent of minefields is not known but probably extensive. Many areas can be reached only by unimproved tracks but these will be impassable because of the threat from mines.

Deductions:

(a) Operations may be limited by obstacles, liaison must be established with the factions to re-establish links using their own equipment;

(b) Helicopters will be needed for casualty evacuation and quite possibly for routine movement;

(c) United Nations combat engineer support will be needed for minefield clearance in areas where local support is not available;

(d) The inaccessibility of some areas because of the mine threat means that alternative surveillance means are needed, perhaps using air photography (with the agreement of all parties).

9. Communications. Civilian communications are non-existent or unreliable.

Deduction: The operation will require independent communications covering the area of operations and linking the area to the remainder of UNPROFOR.

10. Supplies. There are probably shortages of petrol/oil/lubricants (POL), food, potable water and electricity in the areas of conflict. Should the cease-fire hold, it is assumed that much of the normal civilian infrastructure will be restored; UNMOs will in due course be able to live off the local resources.

Deductions:

(a) Some UNPROFOR logistic support will be required, especially in the early stages of deployment;

(b) Generators with necessary fuel and equipment will be needed throughout the area.

11. Accommodation. May be available, but it is possible that it will be occupied by refugees or destroyed. There may not be any accommodation at ECPs.

Deduction: It is considered that the availability of accommodation will be at its worst at the ECPs. It will be necessary to rapidly concentrate into as few ECPs as possible to minimize this requirement. Such points will have to be selected with the accommodation requirements in mind. However, temporary/permanent accommodation may be required at some sites.

12. Medical. Local medical support is inadequate.

Deduction: UNPROFOR medical support must be used to give first aid, to stabilize casualties and to evacuate them, quite possibly by helicopter.

C. Climate

13. There are great extremes of heat and cold in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The task is unlikely to be completed before the start of winter in October.

Deduction: Cold weather equipment, including quite possibly snow ploughs, will be needed to complete the task in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A reconnaissance must be conducted to identify the requirement well before the start of winter.

II. TASKS AND TYPE OF TROOPS REQUIRED

A. Patrol tasks

14. Tasks required to implement the mission are:

- (a) To command the operation;
- (b) To liaise with all sides at the appropriate level as soon as possible;
- (c) To liaise with all United Nations agencies;
- (d) To monitor lines of confrontation;
- (e) To establish and monitor the concentration of heavy weapons at ECPs and to patrol extensively to ensure adherence to the agreement;
- (f) To patrol actively throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and identify and report on areas that require humanitarian assistance.

Manning requirements. UNMOs are best able to achieve these tasks. Infantry battalions do not have the necessary skills. (A large number of such units would be needed to achieve the mission.) Limitations on off-road movement means that air reconnaissance may be required.

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B. Support operations

15. Support operations required by the mission are:

- (a) Route clearance;
- (b) Helicopters;
- (c) Logistics: see appendix B;
- (d) Medical support, based on existing assets with some reinforcement. For details see appendix B;
- (e) A quantity of equipment is needed to achieve the mission. For details see appendix B;
- (f) A public relations campaign is required, using civil or military personnel from outside UNPROFOR;
- (g) Communications equipment will be required which can be operated by UNMOs.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

16. A force of UNMOs will deploy into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Command will be exercised from a forward UNMO headquarters in Bosnia and Herzegovina (HQ UNMO BH) which will report to UNPROFOR headquarters through the Chief Military Observer. Patrol areas will be established throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. These patrol areas will be based on the current areas of conflict and will contain a varying number of patrol teams. Proposed patrol areas are indicated in appendix C. A diagram of the UNMO Bosnia and Herzegovina organization is contained in appendix D. UNMOs will be responsible for the following tasks in order of priority:

- (a) To establish liaison with all parties at a high level at the earliest opportunity;
- (b) To establish low-level, local liaison;
- (c) To control the concentration of heavy weapons;
- (d) To patrol actively throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- (e) To identify, in conjunction with relevant agencies, requirements for humanitarian relief.

IV. THE PLAN

A. General outline

17. Deployment of the UNMOs into Bosnia and Herzegovina will be in a two-phase operation. It will be impossible to start Phase One without reinforcement of UNPROFOR. The minimum requirement is the manpower and matériel associated with the patrol areas headquarters and the HQ UNMO BH.

(a) Phase One. Liaison and reconnaissance; establish a headquarters (HQ UNMO BH), establish initial links and headquarters in patrol areas, identify principles for the concentration of heavy weapons, initiate the public relations campaign, receive and train reinforcements. All activities should be concurrent;

(b) Phase Two. Deployment of patrols; control the concentration of heavy weapons and conduct patrols throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

B. Manning requirement

18. Approximately 1,100 UNMOs with support elements. Details are contained in appendix E.

C. Timing

19. Phase One tasks should be started before 2 August 1992. This cannot be achieved using existing assets.

D. Administration and logistics


20. Details are contained in appendix B.

Appendices

- A. Conflict areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- B. Logistic support
- C. Proposed patrol areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- D. Operational command structure
- E. UNMO manning requirements in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Appendix A

Conflict areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina



Appendix B

Logistic support

HQ UNMO Zagreb

1. The current role of this headquarters will expand. Currently, it has operational command of Bihac and Dubrovnik, and administrative command of UNMOs deployed in Sectors East, West, North, South and Sarajevo.
2. The Bosnia and Herzegovina expanded mandate for UNPROFOR demands that it assume operational command of HQ UNMO BH, and seven patrol areas, within each of which patrol teams equipped with three vehicles will operate. The headquarters will be responsible for the reception and training of all new UNMOs at Zagreb. Additional tasks and related manpower required in HQ UNMO Zagreb are identified below.

Training

3. Assuming a deployment of 1,100 UNMOs, a training team will be required. Initial location of all training to be at Pleso, Zagreb. Should the new UNPROFOR headquarters location be more suitable, this will be adopted. The concept of training will be as designed for the induction of the 120 UNMOs for Sarajevo for the Pink Zones - a two-day package for most with additional medical training for some (see paras. 6-12 below).
4. The training task demands 10 experienced UNMO instructors. After the initial deployment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMOs, this can be reduced to five, the latter figure being sufficient to train the expected turnover of established UNMOs in the mission area.

Administration

5. The requirement will be for an additional seven individuals to fulfil the administrative tasks. They can be military or civilian. They will be required during and beyond the deployment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMOs to support the new establishment of mission UNMOs.

Medical support

6. Refresher training for all UNMOs in first aid to be included in the above programme.
7. Additional training for one UNMO in each vehicle (one in three), sufficient to sustain life for six hours, to be provided. This to supplement unknown medical support within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8. Provision of one enhanced first aid pack per vehicle.

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9. All above from existing British Medical Battalion resources.

10. Resources necessary to establish adequate medical presence at HQ UNMO BH are:

1 Senior Medical Liaison Officer (SMEDLO)
1 Nurse
3 Medics
2 Drivers
2 Signallers

1 (4 x 4) Jeep
2 Ambulances

11. Resources necessary to establish medical presence at each patrol area:

1 Driver
2 Medics
1 Ambulance

12. Total requirement based on one HQ UNMO BH and seven patrol areas is:

PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT	HQ UNMO BH	7 X PATROL AREAS
SMEDLO	1	--
NURSE	1	--
MEDICS	3	14
DRIVERS	2	7
MECHANIC	1	--
SIGNALLER	2	--
JEEP	1	--
AMBULANCE	2	7

Interpreters

13. The HQ UNMO BH will require three interpreters, and each patrol and ECP two each. A total of 200 interpreters will be necessary. Provision for their accommodation and subsistence will be necessary.

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Vehicles/communications

14. Telecommunications connections required for voice and fax at each patrol area and the HQ UNMO BH.

- 1 Car (light) - Senior Military Observer
- 3 (4 x 4) Jeeps per patrol team
- 2 (4 x 4) Jeeps per patrol area headquarters (one with winch)
- 2 (4 x 4) Jeeps per equipment-collection point
- 1 Computer
- 1 Printer
- 1 Fax
- 1 Generator
- 1 Base station of both VHF/HF
- 1 Handie-Talkie per vehicle (5 spares at patrol headquarters) plus
veh charger assembly
- 1 INMARSAT

15. HQ UNMO BH will need to be equipped as per above plus the following:

- 2 Photocopiers
- 3 (4 x 4) Jeeps for UNMO headquarters (stand-by patrol)

16. Total requirement for the above items based on 7 patrol areas,
1 HQ UNMO BH, 62 ECPs, 24 patrol teams and an additional 17 patrols for
Dubrovnik peninsular:

- 8 Cars (light)
- 354 (4 x 4) Jeeps (8 with winch)
- 8 Computers
- 8 Printers
- 8 Fax machines
- 8 Generators
- 8 Base stations of both VHF/HF
- 407 Handie-Talkies (1 per veh; 5 spare at Patrol HQ)
- 8 INMARSAT
- 2 Photocopiers

17. Each vehicle to be equipped to the following scale:

(a) Documentation

- (i) Vehicle trip tickets (appropriately completed and authorized);
- (ii) Insurance card;
- (iii) Vehicle document holder;
- (iv) Maintenance card.

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(b) Equipment

- (i) 1 VHF and HF vehicle-mounted set and antennae;
- (ii) United Nations flag and pole and light;
- (iii) Fire extinguisher;
- (iv) 2 Jerry cans (full) of appropriate fuel;
- (v) Battery jump leads;
- (vi) Jack/brace and vehicle tool kit;
- (vii) Tow rope;
- (viii) Coolant in water bottle (full);
- (ix) Set of snow chains;
- (x) First aid kit;
- (xi) Warning triangle;
- (xii) Spare oil in suitable container;
- (xiii) Internal map light;
- (xiv) Cocker/lantern (same fuel);
- (xv) Tents, 3-man;
- (xvi) Rations/water;
- (xvii) Shovels/axes;
- (xviii) Fragmentation blankets for each team member.

18. Should weather conditions deteriorate during winter, and ECP and patrol teams be dispersed and isolated, there should be a requirement for over-snow vehicles. Two such vehicles would be necessary at each patrol area.


19. There will be a requirement for fuel at HQ UNMO BH in the initial stages, until local resources are identified. This could be a fuel pod vehicle with integral pump unit of up to 4,000-litres capacity.

20. Air support. There could be a requirement for air support for the following:

- (a) As per paragraph 19 above should over-snow vehicles not be available;
- (b) MEDEVAC;
- (c) Routine (limited) resupply in difficult areas;
- (d) Establishing communications (repeater sites);
- (e) Command and control;
- (f) Air reconnaissance.

Appendix C

Proposed patrol areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina



Note: The Dubrovnik area is included in the Bosnia and Herzegovina task.

Appendix E

UNMO manning requirements in Bosnia and Herzegovina

LOCATION	EQPT COL PTS	PATROL TEAMS	HQ	TOTALS
UNMO HQ			10	10
AREA 1	6 (6x6=36x2=72)	3 (3x3=9x3=27)	6	105
AREA 2	12 (12x6=72x2=144)	3 (3x3=9x3=27)	6	177
AREA 3	10 (10x6=60x2=120)	3 (3x3=9x3=27)	6	153
AREA 4	12 (12x6=72x2=144)	6 (6x3=18x3=54)	6	204
AREA 5	8- (8x6=48x2=96)	4 (4x3=12x3=36)	6	138
AREA 6	8 (8x6=48x2=96)	3 (3x3=9x3=27)	6	129
AREA 7	6 (6x6=36x2=72)	2 (2x3=6x3=18) PENINSULA=50	6	146
TOTALS	62 (62x6=372x2=744)	24 (24x3=72x3=216) PENINSULA=50	52	1062

Notes:

1. The total number shown on the chart does not include the additional enhancement of 35 UNMOs required in Sector Sarajevo. This has been determined an operational necessity by Commander Sector Sarajevo. Therefore, the total UNMO requirement would be 1,097.
2. The chart has been designed on a building block format based on the following formula:
 - (a) Each site will have six UNMOs on it at any time because:

/...

- (i) The threat to security of UNMO lives dictates that a patrol team consist of a minimum of two vehicles with at least two crew in each;
- (ii) There is a need for concurrent foot patrolling while manning vehicle-mounted communication equipment. Foot patrols will not be able to communicate over long ranges and hits can only be achieved from the vehicle;
- (b) ECPs must be monitored 24 hours a day. Teams must be rotated in shifts of no more than 12 hours. Therefore there is a requirement for a second six-man team per site. Note that living conditions of the ECPs are likely to be very poor and UNMOs will have to return to a base location regularly;
- (c) Each patrol team consists of a minimum of three vehicles with three UNMOs in each vehicle. As the operational situation improves and the details of the task and the terrain become clearer, patrols will be able to consist of single vehicles with two UNMOs;
- (d) The above table includes 50 UNMOs for deployment to Dubrovnik area to monitor the proposed demilitarization.
